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AVOIDING FORCED PARENTHOOD: A PRACTICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO 
RESOLVE DISPUTES INVOLVING THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS 
Melanie M. Lupsa* 
I. Introduction 
 
Creation of binding law as a means of regulating new technology tends to follow behind 
the invention and utilization of such technology.1  Assisted reproductive technology (ART) is no 
exception2 given its recent surge in popularity.3  In fact, the lack of related legislation has had a 
profound effect.4  This is especially true given that the fertility industry is largely self-regulated by 
independent associations.5  The judiciary specifically is having an especially difficult time 
deciding cases that involve disputes following ART treatment given the absence of legal precedent 
courts rely on for direction.6 
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a type of ART that assists many couples in making an embryo 
of their own, that when implanted in a uterus, could grow into a baby.7   The embryo is created in 
                                                 
*Melanie M. Lupsa, J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Muhlenberg College.  I would 
like to thank Professor Carl Coleman for his guidance and insight in writing this Comment.  
1 See Tom Gjelten, Technology Outpacing Policymakers, Needs of NSA, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: PRIVACY & SECURITY 
(Nov. 19, 2013, 2:54 AM) (Technology is advancing too fast for writing of policy to keep up with it in real time).  
2 See Marina Merjan, Rethinking the “Force” Behind “Forced Procreation”: The Case for Giving Women Exclusive 
Decisional Authority over Their Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 64 DePaul L. Rev., 737, 738 (2005) (The law has not 
kept pace with the increased use of IVF and how stored embryos will be used or disposed of when parties disagree.). 
3 See Heidi Anne Duerr, MPH, Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology Continues to Increase in the United States, 
OBGYN.NET (May 23, 2011) (IVF procedures will increase 32.7% from 97,680 in 2010 to 129,587 in 2050.). 
4 See Michael Ollove, Lightly Regulated In Vitro Fertilization Yields Thousands of Babies Annually, WASH. POST. 
(Apr. 13, 2015) (Both the federal government and the states have given the fertility industry much freedom regarding 
regulatory matters, making the U.S. an outlier compared to the rest of the developed world.) 
5 Alissa Stockage, Regulating Multiple Birth Pregnancies: Comparing the United Kingdom’s Comprehensive 
Regulatory Scheme with the United States’ Progressive, Intimate Decision-Making Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L 
L. 559, 573 (Fertility clinics are self-regulated by professional medical associations.). 
6 See, Firm, Who’s Your Daddy (or Mommy)?? Maryland & Washington, DC Family Law and Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART), BRODSKY RENEHAN PEARLSTEIN & BOUQUET, CHARTERED: WHITEPAPERS (Mar. 21, 2013) 
(Because medical advances have not been accompanied by legal developments, there is little precedent on ART issues 
so courts are forced to resolve issues that few have before considered without precedent.). 
7 See Steven P. Calandrillo & Chryssa V. Deliganis, In Vitro Fertilization and the Law: How Legal and Regulatory 
Neglect Compromised a Medical Breakthrough, 57 ARIZ. L. REV., 311, 314-15 (2015); Michelle F. Sublett, Frozen 
Embryos: What Are They and How Should the law Treat Them, 38 Clev. St. L. Rev. 536, 586-87 (1990). 
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a laboratory by fertilizing an egg of a female with sperm obtained from a male.8  Normally, 
multiple embryos are created at one time regardless of whether the parties intend to use all embryos 
created.9  Creation of multiple embryos is attributable to the high cost of the procedure as well as 
the possibility that the first embryo transfer may be unsuccessful and never implant in the woman’s 
uterus.10  Those who wish to preserve their embryos are given the option to cryopreserve unused 
embryos for future use.11   
IVF reached the public sphere in 1978 when scientists successfully created an embryo in 
vitro which translates to outside the womb.12  Since then, in vitro technology has successfully 
assisted millions of couples who otherwise would not have had the opportunity to reproduce and 
create a family of their own.13  Couples, however, do not always have a happily ever after; many 
cease their relationships in divorce or separation.  Given that the fertility industry has failed to 
institute proper precautions, the fate of preserved embryos has become complicated and ultimately, 
courts are forced to step in and mediate disputes.14   
During the informed consent process before any treatment takes place, couples have the 
option to decide what to do with the embryos they preserve in the event of certain unfortunate 
                                                 
8 See id.  
9 See id. at 3 
10 See id. (Advantages of embryos freezing include decreasing the number of stimulated treatment cycles needed to 
achieve pregnancy and decreasing the costs of ARTs.). 
11 See Sublett, supra note 7 at 587; Marisa G. Zizzi, The Preembryo Prenup: A Proposed Pennsylvania Statute 
Adopting A Contractual Approach to Resolving Disputes Concerning the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 21 WIDENER 
L.J. 391, 392 (2012) (A couple may choose to freeze embryos not immediately implanted to use them at a later date.). 
12 See, supra note 2 at 737-38  
13 See, supra note 9 (“It is estimated that 2.1 million married couples or 5 million people in the United States are 
affected by infertility. . . . Approximately 10-15% of infertile couples become candidates for various forms of Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) to assist them in having their own biological children.”). 
14 See, supra note 2 at 738 (“When the couple that created the pre-embryos no longer agrees as to their disposition . . 
. the courts have had to decide the ultimate fate of those pre-embryos.”); Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo 
Disposition upon Divorce, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233 (2013) (Courts are forced to confront 
disposition of embryos upon divorce and construct alternative resolutions when couples fail to expressly state in a 
contract the disposition upon divorce or public policy renders the contract unenforceable.). 
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circumstances.15  Couples may mutually agree that, upon divorce, separation, death or incapacity, 
they would donate the embryos, destroy the embryos, or grant one of the two parents, also known 
as progenitors, sole control over the embryos.16  Sometimes, however, before ART treatment, 
couples do not explicitly agree to a certain course of action, or the agreement is ambiguous as to a 
method of disposition under the circumstances.17  Even more often, a change of circumstances 
leads one progenitor to refuse to abide by a prior agreement drafted and signed before the embryos 
were created.18 Courts have adopted varying approaches to resolving the issue of which partner 
has the right to use, donate or dispose of the couples’ surplus frozen embryos when the couple 
disagrees.19  
Part II of this Comment will discuss in detail the three divergent approaches used by courts 
to resolve disposition litigation.  This section will define each approach as well as illustrate how 
courts have applied them to resolve disagreements.  It will then discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of adopting each approach.  Part III will suggest a uniform legal framework that 
legislatures adopt for courts to apply when resolving disposition cases.  Based on Part II’s analysis, 
this framework considers the advantages and disadvantages of each disposition method in relation 
to various situations and applies each approach accordingly.  This section will also introduce 
Szafranski v. Dunston,20 a recent Illinois circuit court case that adopted a very similar method of 
analysis as proposed in this Comment. 
                                                 
15 Willian G. Beatty, Szafranski and Beyond: The Continuing Controversy Over Custody Rights to Frozen Embryos 
in Illinois, 25 ILLINOIS ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL 1, 1 (2015).  
16 See id.  
17 See, supra Flannery note 14.  
18 See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (Court denied wife’s desire to enforce signed and valid disposition 
contract in significantly changed circumstances and over the husband's objection.). 
19 See, supra note 15 at 2. 
20 Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
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Part IV will focus largely on Szafranski v. Dunston, highlighting relevant facts, party 
testimony, and the analysis of the court.  Afterward, this section will distinguish the Szafranski 
case from the cases in Part II that adopted the contractual approach to disposition litigation as a 
means of illustrating why the Szafranski court erred in how it adopted the contractual approach.  
Specifically, this section will assert that the definition of contracts used to adopt the contractual 
approach must be refined.  Part V will outline a thorough model code to integrate necessary 
preventative measures as a means of avoiding embryo disposition litigation.  Such measures, if 
taken by fertility clinics, will help to clearly define the intent of progenitors and avoid the issues 
that surfaced in Szafranski.  Finally, Part VI of this will summarize and conclude the Comment. 
II. The Three Approaches Courts Use to Decide Embryo Disposition Litigation  
 
A. The Balancing Approach Defined and Applied  
 
Courts that have adopted the balancing approach believe that the distinct interests of the 
parties in dispute should be balanced and govern the resolution of the dispute.21  The approach 
puts all discretionary power in a judge, for the court is the sole entity that will balance the interests 
of the parties.22  The balancing approach has been adopted both in the absence of a prior agreement 
between the parties as well as in the presence of such an agreement.  
The first court to adopt the balancing approach was the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis 
v. Davis.23  In Davis, the court faced a dispute between progenitors as to the disposition of embryos 
following the couple’s divorce.24  No prior agreement addressed the disposition of the embryos 
and so using the balancing approach, the court evaluated the couple’s conflicting interests.25  
                                                 
21 Id. at 512. 
22 Id.  
23 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). 
24 Id. at 601.  
25 Id. at 604. 
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Ultimately, the court held in favor of the party attempting to avoid procreation because the party 
wishing to procreate could still attempt to do so through another cycle of IVF.26  Notably, however, 
the Davis court stressed that if a prior agreement existed between the parties, that agreement would 
have controlled the resolution of the dispute in entirety.27  As such, the court asserted that the 
balancing test was only a last resort in which case the party wishing to avoid procreation would 
prevail.28 
Likewise, a Maryland Circuit Court adopted the balancing approach in considering the 
disposition of embryos. However, unlike Davis, the court adopted the approach in the presence of 
a valid contract.29   In this case, the parties originally executed an agreement that granted the wife 
the embryos in the event of a separation.30  When that time came, however, the husband wanted 
the embryos destroyed.31  Regardless of the previously agreed upon valid contract made between 
the parties, the court focused solely on balancing the interests of the parties to make a judgment, 
explicitly ignoring the agreed upon contract between the parties.32  Given that the wife’s fallopian 
tubes were removed to help her conceive, she contended that she could not have children without 
using the embryos.33  Balancing the wife’s permanent inability to bear biologically related children 
with the fact that the husband willingly signed away his right to parenthood when he was not 
compelled to do so, the court held in favor of the wife.34  It was simply coincidence that the court 
ruled in such a way that was consistent with the previously made agreement between the parties.35  
                                                 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 597. 
28 See id.  
29 See Bailer Henneberg, Maryland Woman Wins Custody of Frozen Embryos, GREENBELT PATCH (Jan. 7, 2013) 
(describing Maryland Circuit Court case referred to).  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
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B. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach Defined and Applied 
 
Courts that have adopted the contemporaneous consent approach to disposition disputes 
believe that it is most important to promote the current intentions of the parties involved regardless 
of any past agreements.36  Although these courts believe cryopreservation contracts should be 
presumed enforceable, they will not uphold such agreements in disputes where one of the parties 
has had a change of heart.37  This means that “[i]f one of the partners rescinds an advance 
disposition decision and the other does not, the mutual consent principle would not be satisfied 
and the previously agreed-upon disposition decision could not be carried out.”38  
In In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court held that no action can be taken 
regarding disposition when parties disagree about the particular method.39  Contemporaneous 
mutual consent of the parties is required for a disposition method to be lawfully carried out.40  In 
this case, the parties signed a form that required joint consent for release of the embryos unless a 
party became deceased.41  The form, however, did not specify the method of disposition in the 
event of divorce.42  Upon divorce, the wife was opposed to the donation of the embryos and wanted 
to use them to attempt to get pregnant.43  The husband was open to donation or storage but did not 
want to father biologically related children.44  The court held that the embryos were to remain in 
storage, fundamentally in perpetuity, because there was no mutual consent between the parties.45  
C. The Contractual Approach Defined and Applied 
 
                                                 
36 Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An In-alienable Rights Approach to Frozen 
Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 102 (1999). 
37 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782-83 (Iowa 2003). 
38 Supra note 27 at 110-12. 
39 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 773. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 772-73. 
44 Id. at 773. 
45 Id. at 783. 
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Most courts have adopted the contractual approach to disposition cases.  “Under this 
approach, courts . . . enforce contracts governing the disposition of pre-embryos which were 
entered into at the time of IVF informed consent so long as they do not violate public policy.”46  
Consider Kass v. Kass where prior to creating the embryos, the parties signed a consent 
form which provided that in the event of divorce, the disposition of the embryos would be 
determined in a property settlement.47  In spite of this, a provision in that same consent form called 
for donation to research if the couple could not agree on the method of disposition.48  When the 
parties divorced and could not agree on the means of disposition, the New York Court of Appeals 
deemed the cryopreservation agreement valid and upheld the donation provision as it was.49  
In Dahl v. Angle, the parties signed an Embryology Laboratory Specimen Storage 
Agreement before they underwent the IVF procedure that set forth the terms between the couple 
and the clinic.50  The agreement did not address the disposal of frozen embryos following the 
dissolution of the couple’s marriage.51  The agreement did, however, provide that the wife, who at 
the time of the case wanted to destroy or donate the embryos, would have the final say over the 
embryos if the parties disagreed as to their fate in the event of divorce.52  At the time of separation, 
the wife opposed both the usage of the embryos herself and by another couple.53 The husband on 
the other hand, strongly opposed destruction of the pre-embryos and requested the court mandate 
the donating of them to another couple.54   The Oregon court upheld the provision in the agreement 
                                                 
46 Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506; see Witten 672 N.W.2d at 776; supra note 2 at 753.  
47 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998). 
48 Id. at 181. 
49 Id. at 182. 
50 Dahl v. Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 836 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
51 Id. at 836. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
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and ruled in favor of the wife, despite the husband having denied reading or signing the agreement 
stipulating that his ex-wife have ultimate decision-making authority.55  
In Roman v. Roman, a Texas court upheld a provision in a clinic consent form to discard 
unused embryos in the event of divorce.56  The court determined that the form was enforceable 
and thus, controlled the resolution of the disposition of all embryos.57  As such, the court ruled in 
favor of the husband seeking to discard the embryos, although his former wife wanted to implant 
them.58  Likewise, in Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Washington Supreme Court upheld a provision in a 
cryopreservation contract that provided the clinic thaw and discard any embryos still in storage 
five years after the first day of cryopreservation.59  When the couple divorced, the wife sought to 
implant the embryos in a surrogate and the husband sought to put them up for adoption.60  
Irrespective of the progenitors’ desires, the court decided to uphold the contract’s thawing 
provision because more than five years had passed by the time of the court’s decision.61   
D. A Discussion of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Approach 
 
Many of the advantages of one approach act as the disadvantages of another and vice versa.  
As such, it is important to balance the advantages and disadvantages of each approach to 
disposition litigation to determine which promotes justice the best in a given scenario.  
The major controversial aspect of the balancing approach is that the court acts as a 
“decision maker in [a] highly emotional and personal area.” 62  Normally, the justice system 
attempts to avoid involving itself in such situations, especially when parties have contracted 
                                                 
55 Id. at 837, 841. 
56 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. App. 2006). 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 43, 54. 
59 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 263-64, 268 (Wash. 2002). 
60 Id. at 264. 
61 Id. at 268-69. 
62 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779. 
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privately as to the issues in question.63  In cryopreservation disputes, however, courts have 
sometimes found it appropriate to intervene.  As the court in Davis mentioned, when there is no 
contract to refer to, this approach is the best hope in bringing justice to the situation.64  Even in 
cases where there is a contract, more careful consideration of the situation may be necessary if a 
certain outcome severely burdens one of the parties.  This was evident in the Maryland Circuit 
Court decision where the court felt the need to balance the desire to avoid parenthood against the 
desire to be a mother.65  The balancing approach evaluates not only all relevant evidence including 
testimony from parties involved, but also the significance of related public policy concerns.66   
Unlike the balancing approach, the contemporaneous mutual consent approach 
acknowledges that “decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos belong to the couple that 
created the embryo, with each partner entitled to an equal say in how the embryos should be 
disposed.”67  Moreover, the contemporaneous mutual consent approach addresses the biggest 
concern of the contractual approach by allowing a party to change his or her mind.68  Courts that 
have adopted this approach believe that when a couple is unable to agree to the method of 
disposition, the most rational solution is to keep embryos as they are, which generally means 
frozen in storage. 69  According to proponents of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, 
other possible disposition decisions apart from continued preservation are final and irrevocable, 
                                                 
63 Id. See Balt. & O. S. R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he right of private contract is no small part of 
the liberty of the citizen, and . . . the usual and most important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and 
enforce contracts, than to enable parties . . . to escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy.”); Sublett, 
supra note 7 at 605 (“The right of privacy in the United States . . . had developed through case law applying various 
principles of the Constitution. The right of privacy has come to encompass basic decisions concerning the family unit 
such as procreation and . . . the right not to create life.”) 
64 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
65 See supra note 7.  
66 Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 512.  
67 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 27 at 81).  
68 Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 511. See Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777-78. 
69 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 778 (quoting Coleman, supra note 27 at 110-12). 
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and so delaying a hastened decision “makes it possible for the partners to reach an agreement at a 
later time.”70  This notion, however, rests on the assumption that keeping embryos frozen when 
couples cannot agree does, in fact, promote the possibility that the individuals will eventually reach 
a more favorable agreement.71  On the other hand, critics argue that “[i]f the parties could reach an 
agreement, they would not be in court.”72  The main rationale for adopting the contemporaneous 
mutual consent approach is that agreements that in practice eliminate one’s right to decide whether 
or not to become a biological parent violates public policy.73  
Unlike the balancing and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches, the advance 
agreements of the contractual approach, if drafted correctly with the proper guidance, can help 
ensure that individuals who decide to undergo IVF treatment do so only after a full contemplation 
of all repercussions and the making of a reasoned decision.74  If agreed to beforehand, couples can 
“determine the fate of their frozen embryos in a manner that coincides with their beliefs, morals, 
and feelings.”75  Moreover, prior agreements “leave a clear record memorializing [the] parties’ 
intent, which . . .  allow the parties to rely on them, [thus promoting fairness].”76  This is especially 
true where the subject matter of the contract concerns family planning.77  Lastly, previously 
thought out and agreed upon contracts ensure that no party is forced into parenthood.  If a party 
knows they would not like to be a biological parent in the event of separation, they can proactively 
choose not to sign away their right to avoid parenthood.  
                                                 
70 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 778 (quoting Coleman, supra note 27 at 110-12). 
71 Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).  
72 Id.  
73 See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
74 See AMA Code of Medical Ethics Op. 2.141 (June 1994). 
75 Zizzi, supra note 10 at 413.  
76 See Amanda West, Reproductive Freedom or Forced Reproduction: An Analysis of Minnesota Statutory Law 
Dealing with Parentage of Frozen Embryos After Divorce, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLICY 259, 263 (2012). 
77 See Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 515 (Dunston initially embarked on the treatment as a means of assuring she could 
have biologically related children given that the chemotherapy would likely render her infertile.) 
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Naturally, there are several arguments against using the contractual approach to resolve 
disposition litigation.  A large concern in promoting the contractual approach is tied to the length, 
content, and number of informed consent documents that patients are required to sign.  Embryo 
disposition terms may be embedded in various documents78 and “present . . . information using 
highly technical language in densely packed, single-spaced documents, that may not even clearly 
delineate the different topics.”79  The nature of such informed consent forms can “hinder patients’ 
ability to make a thoughtful, informed decision,” 80 especially when couples are emotional.81  
Moreover, disposition forms demand that couples imagine “worst-case scenarios.82  These 
scenarios are focused on future mortality and divorce.83  As a result, accomplishing serious and 
careful drafting becomes difficult given that “[i]t puts people . . . in a really awkward position.”84  
Though this should not matter, it is a factor that many critics believe ultimately prevents parties 
from contracting in a way that would justify adopting the contractual approach in all disputes. 
Lastly, a major criticism of the contractual approach is that even if couples can fully 
contemplate every possible future scenario far in advance, their current views of those scenarios 
should not automatically take precedence over future views of those same scenarios.  Critics assert 
that “individuals are entitled to make decisions consistent with their contemporaneous wishes, 
                                                 
78 Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 67 (2011) (Documents include those that cover risks and benefits, egg retrieval, etc.). 
79 Id. (citing Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 931 
(2000) (discusses problems of consent forms and argues for a change in the way consent forms are presented)).  
80 Stewart Michael Sharp, Common Problems with Informed Consent in Clinical Trials, 5 RESEARCH PRACTITIONER 
133, 135 (identifying problems of poor readability and excessive length as barriers to obtaining informed consent).  
81 See Beatty, supra note 14 at 11 (“Despite the existence of a presumptively valid and enforceable agreement as to 
the custodial and dispositional rights regarding frozen embryos, it may be argued by one of the parties to the agreement 
that the emotional pressure that the party was under at the time of signing vitiated genuine informed consent.”); 
Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 52-53 (considered whether wife was “too emotionally upset to give consent”).  
82 See supra note 83 at 70.  
83 Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Factors That Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions About Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1623, 1628 (2006).  
84 Roy Strom, SCOTUS End Long Illinois Embryo Battle, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN (Mar. 2, 2016 2:25PM). 
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values, and beliefs.”85  As such, “‘treating couples’ decisions about the future use of their frozen 
embryos as binding contracts undermines important values about families, reproduction, and the 
strength of genetic ties.”86  The “possible lack of true informed consent to support the contract” is 
also an issue when the possibility of certain circumstances was never contemplated by the parties 
but are realized and the prior agreement still governs. 87  
Irrespective of the above criticisms, on balance, the contractual approach is the soundest 
means in resolving embryo disposition disputes.  Unlike the balancing and contemporaneous 
mutual consent approaches, the contractual approach attempts to help parties resolve the 
disposition issue both efficiently and effectively.  It not only avoids costly and timely litigation, 
but also preserves resources used to freeze embryos for the right reasons only, not simply because 
a couple cannot agree.88  Furthermore, courts have continuously promoted the freedom to privately 
contract unless the matter is against public policy.89  The contractual approach is in line with this 
principle given that it precludes judicial involvement in private family decisions.90  “By honoring 
the contract that the parties entered into, the parties are given the power in making these personal 
decisions while keeping the state from interfering in the matter.”91   
III. A Proposed Legal Framework 
 
This Comment will propose model legislation that all courts should adopt in embryos 
disposition cases.  The following discussion articulates this uniform legal framework by 
                                                 
85 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 27 at 88-89). 
86 Id.  
87 Beatty, supra note 14 at 8.  
88 See Zizzi, supra note 10 at 400 (“The contractual approach is appealing due to its simplicity . . . .”). 
89 See Voigt, 176 U.S. at 505 (“[T]he . . . most important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce 
contracts, than to enable parties . . . to escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy, unless it clearly 
appear[s] that they contravene public right or the public welfare.”). 
90 Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176.  
91 Zizzi, supra note 10 at 400.  
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considering the advantages and disadvantages of each disposition method in relation to various 
situations.  
A. Situations in Which Each Approach Should be Adopted 
When parties disagree as to disposition and there is no contract in existence to apply the 
contractual approach, the balancing of interests approach is the best hope for an appropriate 
resolution.92  As such, the balancing approach should only act as a supplement to the contractual 
approach, not an approach used by its lonesome.  For instance, it should not be the sole approach 
used by the court in making a judgment, as it was in the Maryland Circuit Court case, when a valid 
contract was executed that clearly stated what the parties willingly agreed to previously.93  
The contractual approach is the only approach that should be applied when a contract is in 
existence and the parties disagree.94  Though it requires courts to adhere to and strictly uphold an 
agreed upon contract despite extenuating circumstances, the applying of the contractual approach 
cannot be shied away from.  It is the only approach that promotes both efficient resolution of 
disputes and effective use of embryo preservation resources.   
In practice, the contemporaneous mutual assent approach should never be adopted.  If a 
contract between the parties exists and the parties disagree, the contract should govern the dispute 
and the contractual approach should be applied. On the other hand, if a contract does not exist and 
the parties disagree, the balancing approach should govern the dispute and the compelling interests 
of both parties should be weighed. Realistically, if both parties are going to be able to 
contemporaneously assent in court before a judge, they should be able to do so outside court and 
                                                 
92 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597; infra Part  IV (discussion of Szafranski holding). 
93 See supra note 7.  
94 See Zizzi, supra note 10 at 400 (“The contractual approach is appealing due to its simplicity . . . .”). 
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so adopting the contemporaneous mutual assent approach is neither effective nor efficient. It not 
only results in costly and timely litigation, but also depletes resources used to freeze embryos.95   
B. Szafranski v. Dunston Resolved Using the Proposed Legal Framework 
The Illinois Appellate Court’s basic approach it used to resolve Szafranski v. Dunston is 
consistent with the framework I propose, and so serves as an example of the efficient and effective 
nature of the proposed legal framework above.  The Szafranski Court held that when parties 
disagree in the presence of a contract, the contractual approach governs.  As such the court found 
that the oral agreement between the parties–providing that plaintiff (Jacob) would unconditionally 
donate his sperm for the defendant’s unconditional use of the resulting embryos–was valid and 
completely binding.96  This resulted in defendant (Karla) being entitled to sole custody.97  
Anticipating an appeal of the decision, the court added that when parties disagree in the absence 
of a contract, the balancing approach governs.98  In this case, the court believed that Karla's desire 
to have a biological child and the fact she could not without using the embryos because she was 
infertile, outweighed Jacob's desire to avoid parenthood.99  The court also agreed with the 
proposition that the contemporaneous mutual consent approach has no place in the debate when 
parties disagree and want a final resolution to their dispute. 
IV. Szafranski Got It Wrong: Defining Contracts Used in the Contractual Approach 
Dependence on an appropriate contract is vital to justified use of the contractual approach.  
As such, what constitutes an appropriate contract in embryo disposition litigation must be refined. 
A. Relevant Case Facts that Illustrate the Court’s Error 
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In 2008, Jacob Szafranski and Karla Dunston began dating and shortly thereafter in 2010, 
Karla was diagnosed with lymphoma.100  She was informed that her course of treatment could 
result in infertility.101  Given her desire to have biological children, she met with a fertility 
specialist at the Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation (Northwestern), who informed her of 
the option to create embryos to be frozen.102  After her meeting with Northwestern, Karla called 
Jacob and told him her options.103  She was nervous about using an anonymous sperm donor and 
so asked Jacob if he would “be willing to provide sperm to make pre-embryos with her.”104  Jacob 
agreed to Karla’s request over the phone.105  
The next day, Jacob and Karla met with Northwestern staff.106  Both parties signed and 
dated the “Informed Consent for Assisted Reproduction” (the Informed Consent) that explained 
Northwestern’s legal rights and obligations.107  Along with providing the clinic’s legal rights and 
obligations, it contained a provision applicable to the disposing of preserved embryos.   
Because of the possibility of you and/or your partner’s separation, divorce, death, 
or mental incapacitation, it is important, if you choose to cryopreserve your 
embryos, for you to decide what should be done with any of your cryopreserved 
embryos that remain in the laboratory in such an eventuality. Since this is a rapidly 
evolving field, both medically and legally, the clinic cannot guarantee what the 
available or acceptable avenues for disposition will be at any future date. At the 
present time, the options are: (1) discarding the cryopreserved embryos, (2) 
donating the cryopreserved embryos for approved research studies, (3) donating the 
cryopreserved embryos to another couple in order to attempt pregnancy. . . . No use 
can be made of these embryos without the consent of both partners (if 
applicable).108  
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Karla and Jacob initialed next to the option to donate the embryos to another couple.109  
After their appointment at Northwestern, Jacob and Karla met with an attorney at the 
recommendation of the clinic.110  With the attorney, they discussed two possible arrangements, a 
co-parenting agreement where Jacob would be, in the very least, financially involved in the child’s 
life, and a sperm donor agreement, where Jacob would have no obligations and waive his parental 
rights.111  Following the meeting, Karla sent an email to the attorney stating that the couple had 
decided to go forward with the co-parenting agreement.112  This agreement was prepared and 
emailed to Karla by the attorney, but was never signed by either party.113 
Shortly after Karla began chemotherapy, Jacob ended their relationship.114  They did not 
speak in the interim.115  A couple months later, Jacob sent Karla an email expressing his concern 
in having created the embryos with Karla and in a second email announced “that he could not let 
her use the pre-embryos and that he wanted them to be donated to science or research.”116  At first, 
Jacob agreed to sign over the embryos to Karla but then changed his mind and filed a lawsuit 
against Karla to enjoin her from using the embryos.117  Karla filed a counterclaim seeking sole 
custody and control over the pre-embryos.118 
B. Relevant Testimony by the Parties Involved 
 
Jacob testified that he “understood the Informed Consent as requiring both his and Karla’s 
approval prior to any use of the pre-embryos.”119  He also testified that during their meeting with 
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Northwestern, he was told by the clinic that any use of the pre-embryos would require the consent 
of both individuals because they were not married.120  He acknowledged that he was encouraged 
to seek an attorney to resolve the issue of what would happen to the embryos in the event of a 
separation.”121  In spite of the above, he relentlessly asserted that he never agreed to any term that 
would give Karla sole control over the disposition of the pre-embryos in the event of their 
separation.122  As a matter of fact, he believed that any such term contradicted what the attorney 
told him his rights would be as a co-parent and what he and Karla both agreed to in the clinic’s 
Informed Consent document.123 
By contrast, Karla testified that it was her understanding that she and Jacob “always agreed 
that he was doing this to help [her] create embryos to have a biological child with no other 
attachment.” 124  Moreover, “it was her understanding that she and Jacob would be documenting 
their wishes through an attorney as opposed to in the Informed Consent.”125 Furthermore, she 
asserted that her and Jacob “agreed that he was donating the sperm for one reason and one reason 
only, for [her] to have biological children after [her] cancer treatment.”126  She claimed that “there 
was really no need to ask for that term to be put into a form” given the nature of their oral agreement 
and mutual understanding of why she was undergoing IVF.127 Regarding the email she sent the 
attorney requesting the co-parenting agreement as opposed to the sperm donation agreement, Karla 
testified that she was going through a very stressful time and did not thoroughly review the draft.128 
C. Appellate Court’s Ruling  
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Jacob conceded that he participated in the forming of an oral contract with Karla to create 
embryos with her.129  Thus, the court was challenged only with determining the scope of the 
agreement between the parties, in other words whether the oral contract was to create embryos or 
create babies.130  “At trial, both Jacob and Karla testified that they never discussed whether Jacob's 
consent would be needed to use the pre-embryos” to create offspring.131  Nonetheless, because 
Jacob admitted that it “never crossed [his] mind to place limitations on Karla's use of the pre-
embryos,”132 the court determined it was reasonable to infer that meant he never desired to limit 
Karla's use of the pre-embryos in any way.133  
Jacob argued that because the oral agreement was ambiguous and “silent on the issue of 
whether Karla has an unlimited and unqualified right to use the pre-embryos,” it could not be 
construed to “reflect the parties' mutual assent or intent to grant Karla such a right.”134  He argued 
that the court should honor the parties' silence regarding limitations.”135  The court addressed 
Jacob’s arguments by reiterating that the consent form contemplated “another agreement between 
the parties may govern the future disposition of the embryos” and that “Northwestern will abide 
by any agreement reached between the parties.” 136  To that end, the court held that “Karla and 
Jacob’s previous oral agreement [which took place over the phone] did not contradict or modify 
any language in the Informed Consent and so was valid and binding.”137  
According to the court, “[t]he Informed Consent merely advised the parties that 
Northwestern had no legal right to use or dispose of the pre-embryos in any manner that either 
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Jacob or Karla would find objectionable.”138  Further, the court asserted that “an informed consent 
agreement was primarily a contract between the couple and the clinic, rather than between the 
donors themselves.”139  As such, the court found that since there was no subsequent signed contract 
following the couple’s execution of the Informed Consent, the oral agreement unconditionally 
bound Jacob in the absolute, and so Karla was entitled to sole custody.140  
D. Criticism of the Court’s Analysis in Szafranski v. Dunston 
i.  The Danger in Inferring a Contract Existed 
A court must not infer the existence of an agreement without sufficient evidence.  The 
Szafranski court found that “[b]y remaining silent on the issue of the embryos’ use, Szafranski did 
not negotiate a contract that gave him the right to later object to their use.”141  In other words, the 
court found that under the facts of this case–which involved a man who provided sperm outside a 
committed relationship, expressly to help a woman preserve her ability to have children in the 
future–it was reasonable to assume the man consented to the embryos’ future use by that woman.  
One critic, however, has gone so far as to say “[i]t appears that in the absence of a written contract 
between the couple, Illinois courts will assume that creating an embryo is the same as agreeing to 
the birth of a child.”142  Despite the actual extent to which the court’s inference applies, such 
assumptions in this context are exceedingly dangerous because parenthood is at stake. 
“An oral agreement is binding where there is an offer, an acceptance, and a meeting of the 
minds as to the terms of the agreement.”143  While there was an oral contract between the 
Szafranski parties in regard to creating the embryos for preservation,144 there was no concrete 
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evidence that suggested Szafranski gave up his right to consent to the actual implantation in the 
womb of the embryos.145  Szafranski explicitly stated that he would provide Dunston with his 
sperm so that she could create the embryos and have the option to use the embryos to have 
biological children, not the right.146  At the point in time he agreed to the oral contract in haste 
over the phone, it was not even certain that Dunston would, in fact, be infertile after chemotherapy 
treatment.147  The creating of the embryos was merely a precaution in case the chemotherapy 
treatment in fact rendered Dunston infertile.148  For that reason, while it is true that Szafranski and 
Dunston had a meeting of the minds as to the creating of embryos, there was no meeting of the 
minds over the eventual implantation of embryos.  Though Szafranski himself admitted that 
placing limitations on Dunston's use of the pre-embryos "never crossed [his] mind," that does not 
mean there was a meeting of the minds as to that issue.149  The silence and ambiguity surrounding 
any limitations should have encouraged the court, like others before it, to lean in favor of 
Szafranski, the individual attempting to avoid parenthood.150  
ii.  The Danger in Relying on an Oral Agreement as a Contract 
An additional criticism of Szafranski involves the court’s reliance on an oral agreement.  
The contract the court relied upon was the oral agreement made between the parties over the phone, 
not the contract made via the informed consent document.151  The Szafranski court was the first to 
use an oral contract as a means of adopting the contractual approach in a disposition suit.  Each of 
the other cases that adopted the contractual approach upheld a written contract.  In fact, the 
majority of cases that adopted the contractual approach considered informed consent documents 
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to be disposition agreements that bound the parties in dispute.152  By contrast, the Szafranski court 
stated that the informed consent document was “a contract between the couple and the clinic, rather 
than between the donors themselves.”153 There was no rational reason for the Szafranski court to 
rely on the ambiguous oral contract between the parties when informed consent documents existed 
and were clear as to Szafranski’s intent since the documents required both parties to consent to 
usage of the embryos.  
Moreover, it appears that what the court believed were the terms of the oral contract directly 
contradict not only the signed informed consent but also the later actions of both parties.  For 
instance, if “Northwestern had no legal right to use or dispose of the pre-embryos in any manner 
that either Jacob or Karla would find objectionable,”154 it can be reasonably inferred that one party 
cannot decide to use the embryos without the other’s consent.  Northwestern is the entity that 
would have to implant the embryos and given the above, the clinic cannot legally do so without 
the consent of both parties.  As such, the court was wrong not to consider the consent form as part 
of the contract between Dunston and Szafranski.  Moreover, the drafting of the co-parenting 
agreement by an attorney also sheds light on the fact that Szafranski intended to retain the 
opportunity to have input in the embryo’s possible fruition.155  Though the contract was not signed 
by either party,156 the fact that it was requested by Dunston, knowing it would give Szafranski 
authority as to the disposition of the embryos, cannot be ignored.  
iii.  The Danger in Uncertainty as to Binding Agreements 
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Szafranski single-handedly “created uncertainty about what types of agreements between 
couples themselves and between couples and their fertility providers will be recognized as 
binding.” Dunston and Szafranski signed a medical consent form provided by the fertility clinic 
which stated, “No use can be made of these embryos without the consent of both partners (if 
applicable).”157  The court ruled that the consent form did not modify the oral contract, which 
explicitly included a provision requiring both parties’ consent.  This is “very dangerous for fertility 
clinics because it’s no longer clear that the contracts [the clinic requires] people [to] sign are 
meaningful at all.”158  It was not appropriate for the Szafranski court to use the oral contract as its 
basis for adopting the contractual approach.  Any agreement between the parties should have been 
viewed holistically in light of all the evidence available; not simply based on a single oral contract 
made over the phone.  Doing so would have made it clear that Szafranski did, in fact, preserve his 
right to consent to the embryo’s fate in the informed consent.  
V. Proactive Measures are Key as a Means of Preventing Szafranski and the Like 
Cases like Szafranski can be easily avoided, but it is the fertility clinic’s responsibility to 
better prepare patients for the potential consequences of their services.  The best way to approach 
this issue is to take the problem out of the court’s hands.  This involves being “proactive and 
resolv[ing] this issue by enacting legislation.”159 
[P]arties should be encouraged . . . before embarking on [in vitro fertilization] and 
cryopreservation, to think through possible contingencies and carefully specify 
their wishes in writing. . . . Advance directives . . . both minimize 
misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors 
the authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal, private 
decision. Written agreements also provide the certainty needed for effective 
operation of [IVF] programs . . .160  
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Legislation that requires fertility clinics to be proactive should be enacted by the state as a matter 
of public policy.  Some states have already taken it upon themselves to do just that.  
A. Examples of Enacted Legislative Approaches to Disposition Agreements  
In Florida, IVF legislation states that,  
all of the decision-making authority concerning the disposition of the frozen 
embryos in the hands of the couple donating the sperm and eggs by stating that ‘a 
commissioning couple and the treating physician shall enter into a written 
agreement that provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, 
sperm, and pre-embryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any 
other unforeseen circumstance.161   
 
The Florida statute also notes that “if there is not a written agreement executed, only then 
can the decision-making authority pertaining to the disposition of the pre-embryos ‘reside jointly 
with the commissioning couple.’”162  As such, when there is a contract present and the parties 
disagree, Florida requires courts to abide by the terms of the contract.163  On the other hand, when 
there is no contract to depend on, Florida adopts the contemporaneous mutual assent approach.164  
The statute, however, stops there.  
California law requires “the health care provider who is conducting the fertility treatment 
to ‘provide his or her patient with timely, relevant, and appropriate information to allow the 
individual to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding the disposition of any human 
embryos remaining following the fertility treatment.’”165  Moreover, the statute “mandates that the 
health care provider giving the fertility treatment is to provide a form to the couple that ‘sets forth 
advanced written directives regarding the disposition of embryos.’”166  Lastly,  
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there are specific choices that the couple or patient is presented with regarding the 
disposition of unused embryos, and the couple or patient is required to choose one 
of the options for the disposition; alternatively, if the couple or patient would like 
to choose another option for disposition that is not on the enumerated list, the couple 
or patient must ‘clearly state’ the alternative option for disposition.167  
 
While Florida’s statute is effective in implementing a uniform legal framework for courts to 
follow, any legislation, if it is to in fact make a difference, should be more similar to California’s 
statute.  
B. Proposed Model Code: Elements Defined and Implications Considered 
The purpose of this model code is to ensure that patients of IVF go into treatment with 
properly drafted contracts to effectively keep disposition litigation out of the courts.  As a 
preliminary matter, the contract should be signed, dated, and written in plain language.168   
i.  Thorough Review of Agreement Terms and Stressing Their Binding Nature 
To begin, fertility clinics themselves should be required to go over each and every element 
of the agreement with the couple seeking in vitro fertilization.  The length and number of consent 
forms that must be completed before IVF treatment, as well as the substance and technicality of 
the language in those forms, should not be a reason to dismiss terms in a contract.  “Patients may 
regard these forms as little more than a ritual to access treatment . . .  [or] perceive that these forms 
exist to protect doctors rather than to contribute to a meaningful, patient-protective educational 
interaction.”169  To counter this, clinical personnel must ensure parties read thoroughly all 
documents they are presented with and ask questions if they do not understand the technical 
language being read.170  Clinical personnel should be required to sign off on thoroughly reviewing 
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the terms with the patients. This will make clinical personnel liable as well when essential terms 
of an embryo disposition contract as missing or patients claim they did not know of or did not 
understand a term they agreed to according to the contract. Requiring such a signature will make 
the thorough review of the terms by the clinical personnel with the patients a fundamental 
requirement that is taken seriously rather than merely a formality.  
If patients intentionally choose to leave a document unexamined, it should not be up to the 
court to remedy the situation and determine ambiguous or absent terms.171  Though informed 
consent documents provide fertility clinics with legal protection,172 such consent forms are also 
for the benefit of the patients themselves.173  In sum, they are meant to act as a precautionary and 
preventative tool so courts do not have to involve themselves in every and all IVF disputes.174  
ii.  Agreeing to Disposition Terms Prior to IVF Procedure 
Participants in IVF treatment should be required to execute a binding agreement prior to 
embryo creation that covers the use and disposition of the embryos in case of divorce, illness, 
incapacity or death of one or both parents or other change of circumstances including but not 
limited to separation or estrangement.175  The agreement ought to state explicitly whether an 
intended parent may use the embryos in the event of divorce or other circumstances.176  Also, the 
agreement ought to contain a statement identifying which of the disposition methods are 
impermissible under applicable law.177  For example, some laws prohibit embryo donation for 
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certain types of research and this should be communicated to the progenitors.178 If this all is done 
correctly, a party to an embryo disposition agreement cannot later withdraw consent to its terms 
and prohibit the use of the embryos to initiate a pregnancy because allowing revocation by either 
party down the line would render any signed agreement meaningless.179  
In fact, requiring detailed and complete agreements made prior to IVF treatment would work 
a benefit to society.  Taking the production of embryos more seriously may indirectly limit the 
rapidly increasing number of embryos created and frozen.180  “It has been estimated that there are 
500,000 spare embryos frozen with an additional 20,000 embryos added yearly.”181 Some remain 
frozen indefinitely.182  Agreements specifically delineating methods of disposition will ensure 
embryos are not kept in cryopreservation for eternity.  
iii. Imagining Worst-Case Scenarios and An Effective Way of Doing So 
When participants are informed that the contracts they are required to sign are complete 
and binding, they are likely to take the production of embryos more seriously.  For example, 
imagining worst-case scenarios together and making decisions as to proper disposition if they 
occur, fosters mutual and peaceful agreement.  An agreement as to disposition should not be an 
issue for individuals who are prepared to bring life into the world.  If individuals believe that 
imagining worst-case scenarios puts them in an awkward position,183 courts should not be forced 
to remedy the situation and parties should deal with the consequences themselves.   
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Correctly drafting advance agreements can only be achieved through the help of attorneys 
who have dealt with couples in similar situations and have experience managing the concerns and 
desires of couples engaged in IVF.  Though it may be considered a radical requisite, couples should 
be required by all fertility clinics to consult with an experienced reproduction law attorney before 
the clinics can sign off on informed consent documents.  The attorney can be one of the 
participants’ choosing or one on staff at the clinic.  Either way, before a clinic can go forward with 
treatment, the attorney must be sure all contracts are as encompassing as they can be given the 
situation.  Patients must be compelled to fully contemplate all possible scenarios that may arise 
after treatment.  An attorney can assist the couple in considering potential scenarios and how to 
contract for the mutual benefit of the parties.  More likely than not, this will result in the contractual 
realization of the couple’s present and future desires, wishes, values, and beliefs.  If fertility clinics 
simply advise patients to consult with an attorney, many will not and so will not obtain the expert 
analysis that will allow them to truly consider all possible scenarios and create a properly drafted 
contract.  
Critics may find it inappropriate to require attorneys to advise patients, specifically because 
the cost of doing so would be borne by the clinic or the patient.  These critics, however, must 
understand that this requirement is a necessary means to an end.  IVF procedure should be 
considered a privilege with heightened responsibility.  Moreover, some may find it inefficient to 
require an attorney because of the potential for competing interests between the parties.  In those 
cases, the parties must be required to use separate attorneys to represent their interests in the final 
contract.   As such, fertility clinics should have multiple experienced reproductive attorneys on 
site or at their disposal.  
iv.  Using Standardized Forms the Right Way and Restriction on Supplemental Contracts 
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Another important practice that must be followed in IVF clinics is the modifying of 
standardized informed consent forms.  Though standardized forms are the best way to ensure that 
all the major options are included and clearly explained, parties should be free to modify the 
standardized form.  Doing so largely eliminates the possibility of clinics not properly setting forth 
the parties’ intentions with respect to disposition decision.   There are many other possibilities 
couples can consider that are not typically mentioned in standardized forms.184  Such possibilities 
include “dividing the remaining embryos between the parties; allowing for one party to use the 
embryos, but specifying that the ex-spouse not be considered a legal parent under that situation, or 
specifying that parental rights would flow from post-dissolution use of any embryos.”185  Many 
couples would be unaware of their possible options if they are not properly advised.  Thus, the 
entire contract presented to the couple by the clinic should be largely individualized even if it starts 
out standardized initially.  It should be created similar to how a deposition or affidavit is created 
as opposed to how a job application or medical insurance form is filled out by a patient.  
Additionally, any other contracts, regardless of nature, should not be able to supplement 
informed consent forms as was allowed in Szafranski.  Supplemental contracts, even if drafted by 
attorneys, only complicate the fertility clinic’s ability to properly set forth the agreed upon terms 
of the contract.  Further, if the original agreement between the parties is properly drafted there 
should be no need for supplemental agreements.  As such, embedding all disposition agreements 
in the clinic’s informed consent form both increases efficiency and eliminates questions of the 
types of agreements that will be recognized as binding.  It seems most practical to give the clinic 
the sole responsibility to finalize a valid and binding disposition contract.  After all, the clinic is 
the first to sit with the patients, conduct the IVF procedure, and later store the embryos.  Having a 
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single source of concrete guidance as to the disposal of the embryos will also save the clinics as 
well as patients, time and money when it comes to disputes.   
v.  The Overall Benefit 
A model code will not always create a perfect contract, however mandating the creation of 
complete and integrated binding agreements up front makes it less likely that this will be the case.  
In the end, the goal is to better prepare couples for what may lie ahead if they chose to undergo 
IVF treatment.  Thus, even if a model code avoids a small amount of costly litigation for couples, 
it is a great victory for the regulation of the IVF industry.  There will be no need for a court to 
decide the type of ambiguity in contracts as in Szafranski.  The use of seasoned reproductive and 
family law attorneys early on will likely guarantee that no couple will ever enter into an agreement 
that contains determinative ambiguities detrimental to the parties.  For the most part, this 
framework will also do away with the need to balance competing interests.  Parties should be told 
up-front that their agreement will govern regardless of changing desires and be allowed to add any 
provisions they feel necessary to protect themselves.  
C. Conclusion  
Complete contractual agreements made before commencement of IVF procedures truly 
capture the intentions of the parties at the time the embryos are created.  Ultimately, courts should 
be concerned with upholding already contemplated terms, rather than trying to decipher parties’ 
changed intentions.  In emotional situations, there must be some concrete guidance as to what 
should be decided without judicial intervention.  Furthermore, if there is no incentive for patients 
to truly consider the risks and benefits of undergoing IVF treatment at the onset or parties can 
freely change their mind and file lawsuits to enforce their wishes, couples will certainly take less 
care in making these important initial decisions.  A legal framework is necessary to address 
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disposition disputes in the fertility industry because it is our only hope in giving more structure to 
the disposition of embryos and provide courts with an ability to approach issues systematically.  
This, in turn, will benefit all IVF patients, as it would have in Szafranski v. Dunston, by helping 
society avoid forced parenthood and other issues that emerge.  
